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West Europe Report

(FOUO 7/82)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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ECONOMIC

SWITZERLAND

TRADE, ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH USSR

Moscow FOREIGN TRADE in English No 12, Dec 81 pp 23-25

[Article by Viktor Golubchik: "USSR-Switzerland: Trade and Economic Relations in the Tenth Five-Year-Plan Period (1976-1980)"]

[Text]

The years, which have passed since the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed, have been marked by the successes of political detente. Its materialization is clearly seen in the further development of all-round, mutually beneficial relations between states with different social systems. "Peaceful cooperation between countries of the two systems," the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union emphasized, "is by and large, making good headway... Economic, scientific, technical and cultural ties are expanding, and are taking on new qualities."¹

In this period Soviet-Swiss trade and economic relations are characterized, first and foremost, by their significantly strengthened treaty and legal foundation, improved mechanism of bilateral cooperation and steady growth of mutual trade.

On January 12, 1978, Bern was the place of signing the ten-year Agreement on the Development of Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technical Cooperation between the two countries, expressing their desire to expand economic relations on the principles of the Final Act of the All-European Conference.

¹ L.I. Brezhnev, *Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981, p. 41.

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In accordance with this Agreement a Long-Term Programme for the Development of Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technical Cooperation was signed in Bern and came into force on July 9, 1979, providing for a wider exchange of goods and services, mutual participation in the construction, expansion and modernization of industrial installations and enterprises, and furthering scientific and technical cooperation in various industries, agriculture, fundamental and applied sciences, environmental protection and other fields. In its comments on the signing of the Long-Term Programme, the Swiss press pointed out that it would facilitate the Swiss exporters' activities on the Soviet market for a long time and would in future enable the USSR and Switzerland to gain more precise knowledge about both countries' requirements.

Since 1973 the Soviet-Swiss Joint Commission on Scientific, Technological, Industrial and Economic Cooperation, entrusted with control of the implementation of the 1978 Agreement and the 1979 Long-Term Programme, has functioned successfully. Since its establishment the Commission has held seven sessions to discuss questions concerning the progress and prospects of scientific, technological, trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. The Commission is an important instrument furthering trade and economic ties. Fully specified problems and spheres of mutual interest make its meetings purposeful.

The Joint Commission has set up six working groups whose tasks are to find ways of expanding cooperation in such vital economic spheres as machine-tool making, electrical and power engineering, the production of pharmaceutical and low-tonnage chemical products, the watch, textile and food industries.

The 1970s witnessed the establishment in Switzerland of a number of joint-stock companies with Soviet foreign trade organizations. These companies make a noticeable contribution to strengthening business cooperation between the two countries. They mediate in supplying Switzerland with oil and oil products (Sowoil), selling jewellery (Rus-salmaz), rendering goods transportation services (Sowchart) and in banking operations (Woschod). In their turn, seven Swiss firms and Swiss Credit Bank (Crédit Suisse) have offices in Moscow. Their purpose is to establish closer contacts between Swiss firms and Soviet foreign trade and other

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organizations, raise efficiency and impart flexibility to the solving of commercial and technical questions.

In accordance with the Agreement on Cooperation between the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Swiss Trade Promotion Bureau (Office Suisse d'Expansion Commerciale) Soviet foreign trade associations conduct lively cooperation with relevant enterprises and firms of Switzerland and are active participants in international fairs and exhibitions held in both countries.

Between 1976 and 1980 nineteen specialized exhibitions of Soviet export goods were held in Switzerland. Soviet foreign trade associations are regular participants of the International Auto Salon in Geneva and the International Spring Fair in Basel among others. For instance, more than 20 All-Union foreign trade associations took part in the 1978 and 1980 fairs in Basel. In their turn between 1976 and 1980 Swiss firms participated in 64 international fairs in the USSR and held 34 specialized exhibitions. In 1978 Moscow was a venue of the second successful exhibition of Swiss machine tools at which the country's 70 firms displayed their products.

In 1975 the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry opened its office in Zurich. In 1980 alone the office helped more than 500 Swiss organizations and firms establish contacts with Soviet foreign trade organizations by arranging their participation in exhibitions in the USSR and business trips to our country. Thus, in the last five years nine authoritative delegations of Swiss businessmen have visited the Soviet Union.

Within the framework of agreements between the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology and seventeen Swiss firms ever greater significance is being acquired by the two countries' scientific, technological and industrial ties in such branches as machine-tool making, metallurgy, transport, power, looms and food-processing engineering industries, automated information systems, the manufacture of chemical, pharmaceutical and aromatic products, chip-board, ships' automation, the food industry.

For example, in powder metallurgy the Paton Electric Welding Institute of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and the Byelorussian Republican Research and Industrial Powder Metallurgy Association maintain contacts with the Swiss firm, Castolin. Work on defining the problems for

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scientific and technological cooperation between the USSR Ministry of Machine Tool and Instrument-Making Industry and the Swiss Association of Machinery Manufacturers in the production of metal-cutting lathes for the period ending in 1990, is nearing completion. In the field of experimental and clinical study of new medicinal substances as well as diagnostics and regeneration, successful cooperation continues with traditional Swiss partners, Ciba-Geigy, Sandoz, F. Hoffmann-La Roche. Cooperation is coming on with other firms not parties to the agreements but which show interest in joint research of a certain theme. To cite an example, the USSR Ministry of Electro-technical Industry and the firm Isola-Werke of Switzerland are jointly elaborating a programme of cooperation in the field of electric insulating materials, systems of isolation and casting of polymer insulators. The USSR Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machinery Industry and the Swiss firm, Duap, have signed a stage-by-stage working plan for developing technology and making equipment for machining components of a diesel motor fuel system. Cooperation has been established with the Plasmotechnika firm in the field of powder metallurgy. In 1979 and 1980 alone about 20 seminars and symposia were arranged in which the following Swiss firms took part: Afig, Bell, Kern, Lamb, Lucerna, Maag, Ciba-Geigy, Ulano, Yacob Müller, besides others.

The Joint Commission's Seventh Session recorded its satisfaction with the two countries' scientific and technical cooperation and noted the favourable possibilities for its expansion and consolidation.

Contacts have been established with small and medium-sized firms. Today, the All-Union foreign trade associations have trade and economic relations with more than 300 such Swiss firms.

All the above has had a positive impact on the expansion of mutual trade and constitutes an important indicator of the level of developing economic ties between our countries.

Between 1976 and 1980 both countries exchanged goods worth 180 per cent more than in the 1971-1975 period. The Soviet Union delivered to Switzerland 1,300 million rubles' worth of commodities and its imports accounted for 1,400 million rubles.

In 1980 the trade turnover between the USSR and the Swiss Confederation reached nearly 850 million rubles, a 160 per cent increase over the 1975 figure.

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	Soviet-Swiss Trade				
	(mln rubles)				
	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Turnover	371.4	375.0	510.8	590.3	847.6
Soviet export	109.1	152.6	286.2	314.4	445.1
Soviet import	263.3	222.4	224.6	275.9	402.5

The trade level reached was due, first and foremost, to the wider range of goods and the increased physical volume of mutual deliveries.

As compared to the previous five-year period, between 1976 and 1980 Soviet sales of machines, equipment and consumer goods to Switzerland nearly doubled; Soviet export of chemicals increased more than 50 per cent, and that of furs and articles made from fur, nearly four times.

During the same period Soviet purchases of Swiss equipment and machinery grew from 171 to 189 million rubles in 1980, including: chemical equipment (from 6.4 to 9.0 million rubles) and electrode products (from 6 to 27), food-processing equipment (from 2.4 to 17.0) and instruments and laboratory equipment—from 4.3 to 11.2 million rubles respectively.

Soviet imports of Swiss chemicals increased from 25.6 to 38.6 million rubles, and those of insecticides and pesticides, from 20 to 39.5 million rubles.

The Soviet share in Swiss foreign trade and Switzerland's proportion in the total external commerce of the USSR are relatively small: about three and one per cent respectively. Nevertheless the mutual goods exchange has definite significance for the development of the two countries' economies.

Between 1976 and 1980 Soviet exports to Switzerland consisted mainly of oil and oil products (on the average about 60 per cent), chemicals (about four per cent), machines and equipment (more than two per cent), furs and fur articles, food-stuffs, and consumer goods.

Within this period Switzerland bought from the Soviet Union almost 50 million rubles' worth of chemicals, 30 million rubles' worth of furs and fur articles, and also machines and equipment worth approximately 30 million rubles. About 700 metal-cutting lathes carrying the trade-marks of Moscow, Leningrad, Gorky, Ryazan and Kolomna enterprises, are working at Swiss firms. During 1976-1980 Switzerland's motor vehicle fleet was replenished with nearly 10,000 passenger cars from

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the Soviet Union. Swiss buyers highly appraised the Lada-Niva car which earned a fame of a "reliable and inexpensive, hard-working car". In addition, the USSR also supplies Switzerland with nearly all its pyrite, more than 50 per cent of peat and one-fifth of the asbestos the country imports.

At the same time the Soviet Union is a large and stable market for a number of Swiss industries.

The most important Soviet imports from Switzerland are machines and equipment (56 per cent), chemical products (nine per cent), insecticides and pesticides (about eight per cent), dyestuffs, and consumer goods.

For many a year now every tenth or eleventh metal-cutting machine exported by Switzerland arrives in the USSR. The Soviet Union is a major purchaser of Swiss milling equipment. Switzerland sells in the USSR one-third of multibased acids, small-diameter steel pipes, considerable quantities of pumping-and-compressor equipment, geodetic, topographic, navigational, geophysical and other instruments and devices, insecticides.

Stable links with Soviet foreign trade organizations enable Swiss firms to plan production volumes and assure employment. Export to the socialist countries, a considerable part going to the USSR, provides Switzerland with several dozen thousand work places which is not a small number for a country where the number of workers employed in industry does not exceed 700,000.

For the Soviet Union the cooperation with Switzerland is conducive, in some measure, to the expansion and stream-lining of a number of Soviet enterprises, thus raising their efficiency, and ensuring the supply of basic materials for some industries and a wide range of consumer goods for the population.

The Seventh Session of the Joint Commission, held in Moscow 1980, positively appraised the progress and prospects of Soviet-Swiss trade and economic cooperation.

It should be pointed out, however, that the two countries' relations do not reflect many new forms of cooperation which are being successfully used in mutually advantageous ties with other industrial countries of the West and which are recommended by the Long-Term Programme of Cooperation between the USSR and Switzerland.

The two countries' cooperation on a compensation basis is making its first steps. Last September,

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Soviet foreign trade organizations and the Swiss firm Interplastika, signed a contract for the delivery to the USSR of equipment for the Segezha pulp-and-paper mill (Karelian ASSR) to process crude tall oil and sulphate soap. The cost of services rendered and equipment supplied on a commercial credit basis, will be repaid with exports to Switzerland of crude tall oil and some other chemicals.

Industrial cooperation, a modern form of co-operation, has not as yet developed very far. Only two agreements on production cooperation have been signed with Swiss firms and these quite recently.

The countries have gained experience, though not large, of Soviet organizations' and Swiss firms' joint cooperation in third countries. For instance, the All-Union Association Energomachexport, jointly with Brown Boveri, participated in cooperated deliveries of equipment for the Sigalda hydro-electric power station in Iceland and with Brown Boveri, Mannesmann and EFT (Federal Republic of Germany) on the joint construction of the Kardia electric power plant in Greece. There are every prospects for furthering such cooperation.

Talks are under way on the deliveries of Soviet natural gas to West European countries and on purchases, on a long-term credit basis, of machinery and equipment for the construction of a gas pipeline and the development of gas deposits. "The signing of an Agreement between both countries' organizations on Soviet deliveries of natural gas to Switzerland," reads the Protocol of the Joint Commission seventh session,— "would be conducive to maintaining and expanding trade turnover between the USSR and Switzerland for a long time."

The Long-term Programme has defined the possibilities and specific directions for promoting mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation between the two countries for a long time ahead.

Proceeding from principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and the need to consolidate detente throughout the world, the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union confirmed the USSR's invariable principled stand aimed at establishing stable, mutually beneficial trade, economic, scientific and technical relations with the capitalist countries showing an interest in conducting trade with the Soviet Union. These principles underlie our trade and economic ties with Switzerland.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

RELATIONS EXAMINED BETWEEN MITTERRAND, PSF DEPUTIES, PARTY

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 11-17 Dec 81 pp 79-81

[Article by Raymond Aron: "The Sphinx, or French Socialism"]

[Text] The constitution, the election of the president of the Republic by direct universal suffrage, and the two round single member district system for the representatives, force the political class and the French to divide themselves into two camps. Today, the nostalgia for the /somewhere else/ [printed in italics] can be found in well known territory, minister of Francois Mitterrand... In the final analysis, the somewhere else served as a bridge between the two camps. Why should this be surprising? Outside of the two camps, there is room only for spectators or critics.

Suddenly, the debates or the battles within each of the two camps interest commentators as much as or more than the dialogue of the deaf between the two camps. In the past, one wondered about the relationships between Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Jacques Chirac, and between Georges Marchais and Francois Mitterrand. During the last presidential campaign, it was these relationships which determined the outcome of the tournament: Chirac conclusively settled his score with the former president of the Republic, and Marchais temporarily buried the hatchet. The former majority, which has become a powerless minority, is still looking for a chief, a style and ideas. The only thing left to populate the desert of the political scene is the government and the Socialist Party, both of them curious animals of the political bestiary.

On the eve of 10 May, the Socialist Party, which was born at the congress of Epinay and which chose Francois Mitterrand as first secretary thanks to the rallying of Pierre Mauroy, had about 200,000 active members. And it obtained millions of votes (up to 9,432,362 last June). The disproportion between the number of active members and the number of voters is also found in other more or less socialist parties in Western Europe, such as the British Labor Party, for example. However, following a tradition which goes back to the parties which called themselves social democrat at the end of the last century -- revolutionaries at the time --, the party, that is to say the active members, does not give a free hand to the parliamentary group. Leon Blum could not accept or reject participation in the government without getting permission from the party. For the time being, Francois Mitterrand has nothing to fear from the party, which is administered by Lionel Jospin and whose factions have committed a provisional hara-kiri, but he will not forget that he needed the left wing, the CERES [Center for Studies, Research and Education] to hold a majority against the Mauroy-Rocard alliance. True, by choosing Pierre Mauroy to be prime

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minister, Francois Mitterrand rewarded, not someone who had always been loyal, but a renegade from the opposition at the congress of Metz.

The parliamentary group resembles the party more than the government does. The latter imperfectly represents the parliamentary group and the party. Graduates from the National School of Administration have not completely disappeared from the paths of power and, even though the wait seemed a long one to him, the minister of economy and finance has taken a short cut in terms of the customs of the party. He received a portfolio, but not a constituency. The setting up of the socialist state is going full speed, but it is the president who makes the choices. Francois Mitterrand has acquired the royal style as quickly as his predecessors. He founded a Computer Science Institute (with a 100 million French franc credit) despite reservations from the experts. Hence, a press conference or a television interview constitute an event, even when the president does not seem to have any big news to communicate to the country.

In the area of inflation and unemployment, against which the current majority -- then in the opposition -- raged, there is nothing new. The number of job seekers exceeds 2 million: perhaps the increase in numbers has a tendency to slow down. The diagnosis is about the same in terms of price hikes: neither acceleration nor deceleration. It goes without saying that, if we were to take the tone adopted by today's masters to rebuke yesterday's masters, there would be no lack of arguments to give the socialists a modesty of which they do not seem to have an excess.

But, because of the upheaval caused by the "change," the worst was to be feared. A certain boost to the economy is taking shape, prompted by the purchasing power as spread out after May, and also following the weakness of stocks last spring. Even the figures relating to foreign trade, which remain mediocre, are not getting noticeably worse. At the beginning of the year, exports were stimulated by the rigor of the management of public finances all through the year 1980 and by stagnation. At the present time, the relative reduction of the dollar (currency in which import prices are quoted) is improving the terms of trade. The devaluation of the French franc in relation to the mark filled a need and should improve the trade revival of France within the European Economic Community.

If Pierre Mauroy would give up the incantations, if he would stop giving himself over to an eloquence typical of agricultural shows ("the nationalizations, an expression of the French genius"), if he would work at Matignon rather than running around all over France, the impression of crisis or of a state of emergency would dissipate.

Not that the socialist management does not lend itself to criticism, but the major government decisions were included in its platform, even though Francois Mitterrand's campaign focused on the "calm strength" rather than on the socialist project which he bluntly refused to take responsibility for. The fact remains that the nationalizations, the division of labor, the increase of social expenditures and of the budgetary deficit, the reduction followed by the elimination of the family quotient, all these measures the French, consciously or not, approved through their vote.

I often explained, prior to the elections, that in my eyes there is no economic or even political justification at all for the full nationalization of credit, and that the nationalization of large international enterprises can only be explained by an ideology of archaeo-socialism. Now that Mitterrand and the socialists are in power,

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we are waiting to see whether these reforms will be carried out under conditions which reduce their risks. In the battle of the nationalizations within the administration, the moderates have been defeated. An intelligible and foreseeable outcome: the list of nationalizations goes back to an agreement between the Socialist Party and the Communist Party and has been maintained against all odds, thanks to the fantasies and convictions of the president of the Republic. What is the use of arguing?

The quarrel over the "pause" fits into a different category. The word used by Jacques Delors could equally be fortunate or unfortunate. Fortunate, because, on the face of it, it enjoyed the support of a major former party leader. Leon Blum used the word 6 months after having come to power, at a time when some of these measures had boosted the economy, when others (the 40 hour law) had slowed it and when his policy as a whole had upset half the country. Unfortunate, because today's economic conditions do not resemble those of December 1936. Those measures which I believe will be harmful in time -- the recruitment of 200,000 civil servants, the reduction of the retirement age, the reduction of working hours -- have not yet produced any of the regrettable consequences one might have feared. A policy which definitely increases the number of workers but not that of jobs drops its mask only in time. As for an end to the reforms, this is in certain respects impossible, even if in other respects it is desirable.

Decentralization as Gaston Defferre understands it will lead to an additional recruitment of civil servants, and thus an increase in the costs of the national administration at a time when all countries are worried about state expenditures which require ever greater demands on the economy. But the laws on decentralization require other laws which specify the distribution of functions among the three bodies: municipalities, departments, regions. I deplore the politicization of local administrations, which will inevitably result from the Defferre decentralization and the metamorphosis of the prefect turned chief administrator of the Republic. As the government wants to put the whole system into place by 1983, it is forced to have the second set of laws relating to decentralization passed.

As far as the reform of social security and of the tax system are concerned, two economic reporters -- one in LE MONDE, the other on "Europe 1" -- expressed apparently contradictory opinions: one of them noted that the reform of the tax system would require extreme caution, that it is easy to criticize the housing tax and the professional tax, as both of them are considered bad, but that it will be necessary to find the approximately 60 billion French francs which these two taxes bring in. The other commentator stated, in an equally convincing manner, that the reform of social security and of the tax system are not the result of a compulsion for reforms, but of constraints.

The increase of social security and family allowance expenditures calls for new resources for which ordinary procedures -- removal of ceilings, additional points on salaries -- will not be sufficient. Hence, we may expect a partial taxation of social security. At the same time, the tax reform will not be limited to eliminating bad taxes and replacing them with good ones; inheritance and income taxes would be changed. By the spring or the fall of 1982, the cost of the government's policy for the population as a whole will become apparent.

These problems of figures hardly lend themselves to flights of poesy. The debate on the respective merits of social democracy and socialism leaves more room for rhetoric and verbalism. The term social democrat was considered a pejorative one

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by the socialists. Two ministers, Jacques Delors and Robert Badinter no longer hesitate to call themselves social democrats.

We know socialism after the Soviet fashion: nationalization of all means of production, a detailed and authoritarian planning of the whole economy, the country directed by a single party and deprived of all personal and intellectual liberties. Well, Georges Marchais states that the overall balance sheet of this kind of socialism is a positive one. And comrades of Marchais are members of the government of Pierre Mauroy, who definitely does not judge the balance sheet of this kind of socialism to be a positive one. In any case, Francois Mitterrand certainly does not take it as a model.

Sweden, which was governed for 44 years by a party which called itself socialist, pushes the redistribution of incomes through taxation further than any other country (state expenditures and redistributed sums approach 80 percent of the gross domestic product). But the Swedish socialists did not nationalize the major international enterprises, which are the driving force of prosperity. Francois Mitterrand does not take Sweden for a model either, because it respects the head (or the heart) of capitalism, specifically the large industrial enterprises and credit.

What then is the socialism of the president of the Republic? For the present, it includes a certain dosage of nationalizations and a certain dosage of income redistribution through taxation and social security. The last word has not been said yet in either of these chapters.

As long as the government does not go beyond this framework, it does not basically differ from the other European countries which are also referred to as being social democratic. Whether there are more or less nationalizations, more or less redistribution of income, these countries, integrated in the world economy, submit to the rules of the market. Everywhere, governments intervene in order to ensure overall balance, to fight against underemployment or against deficits in the balance of foreign payments, or to encourage a branch of industry. In this respect, France has for a long time been a social democracy. State expenditures and social security together represent 43 percent of the gross domestic product, a 7 point increase during the 7 years Valery Giscard d'Estaing was in office.

Up to now, the socialist government has stated on every occasion that France wants to remain in the European Community and in the world market, hence that it is not considering an overall planning of the economy: how could an authoritarian plan be imposed when the workers in industry work 2 days a week for foreign markets, hence for clients over whom the planners have no authority?

According to the socialist project, the party does not want to reform capitalism but break with it. But what does such a break mean? Either it implies withdrawal from the capitalist economy or else it only has a symbolic value. Let us assume the second interpretation: the break with capitalism, devoid of a precise meaning, refers to the nationalizations, and the themes of archaico-socialism which have become obsolete in the advanced nations of the European Community. Simultaneously, France is embarking on a policy which implies an increased redistribution of incomes, whereas all the European countries have noted that the welfare state also leads to an impasse. The annual increase of social expenditures, which is higher than that of the national product, remained at a tolerable level as long as the economy was

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growing at a 5 to 6 percent rate. If this rate is reduced to 2 to 3 percent, the so-called social democratic system may well become unbearable.

French socialism has picked up an idea which was fashionable before 1914, perhaps, before 1939: the nationalization of a few large enterprises and a practice which was common all over the Western world during the "30 miraculous years," an increased redistribution of incomes. Two old-fashioned ideas, even though honorable, do they make an event of universal history, the revenge of Leon Blum over Lenin?

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

PCF PURPOSE, PERSONNEL IN NEW GOVERNMENT

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 13 Nov 81 pp 88-89

[Article by Jean Cau: "The PCF's Moles "]

[Caption] A conversation (he won't contradict me if he recognizes himself) which I had fraternally with a communist official after 10 May and before the legislative elections. "Mitterrand has succeeded in his task. You have just received a mighty blow with Marchais' 16 percent, and you're liable to get another serious one in the legislative elections." "So what? Do you think that 2 or 3 percent more or less matters to us? Do you think we aren't familiar with Mitterrand's tactics? Do you think we don't know what he is saying, what he wants, and what he confides to some people and to others? But that's not what matters to us." "Then what?" "Don't you know? Between you and me, don't you know?" "Not entirely, but...." "There is nothing secret about it. What we want to do is destabilize the capitalist society besiege it, and make it explode from within. That is clear. And if Mitterrand offers us a wider range of activities than Giscard, then we'll make use of Mitterrand."

"Thanks to Its Ministers, It is Creeping in Everywhere

For Us, Mitterrand is a Means

[Text] Whatever happens in the meantime, he has gotten the better of you. "That's how you see it. But we don't. You are an adversary, but I don't take you for an imbecile. Do the same for us. Do you sincerely believe that we are a party like the rest?" "No...." "We are the party with the greatest number of militants. We can stop 30 factories overnight. We are everywhere. We are also the richest party. Have you read Montaldo's books?" "Yes." "Well, Montaldo is right. Except that what he debits us, to break us, credit us with it to measure our strength. It's true, we are very rich. Don't forget also that we depend on the USSR. For us, Mitterrand is a means, a passageway, an opening. As long as he allows us to advance and create the irreversible, we will not budge; if he gets a notion to give us the sack, then you'll see our departure and the rioting. But we will have gone up another peg. We are patient and there is time for us." "Say would you be willing, in broad

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daylight, to give me an interview and say what you have just said, using your own name?" "Why? What's new about what I have said? We've been repeating for over 50 years that we are Leininists, collectivists, pro-Soviet; that we are fighting capitalism to destroy it in its various forms, and you're saying that you'll learn that from an interview?"

No, we won't learn anything. Except that people are still surprised--they are and they aren't--when a communist tells them calmly, while they're in his company, that his party wants to make the society and political system in which they live explode from within. That his own type of democracy is popular; that his "universally positive" model is the USSR; that his ideal is the single party; that his Mecca is Moscow. And that Mitterrand's policy is nothing but a means for creating the irreversible and for advancing the pawns of his party a little further. Why are people surprised? Because it is so clear as to be blinding. And if, as it was said not long ago, "the Soviets are playing chess and the West, belote," what game is M Mitterrand playing with the communists today? Reducing their numbers while integrating them? Well! The bet has been lost. The wolf can never become the sheep dog. Even if it did, it would remain a wolf and would devour the sheep.

The PCF or, yesterday, a substate in the nation (the most legally in the "free" world, besides which our democracies most obligingly hold their doors wide open--the doors to mayors' offices; general and municipal councils; unions; businesses; various associations and movements; administrations; teaching institutions; etc.--to those whose avowed purpose is to destroy their systems.) The PCF or, today, the communist state in the government, which delivered four powerful spots to it. Four ministries on which hundreds of thousands of civil servants depend. Four command posts from which it can drill its troops at leisure. On the day it retires, whether it be in 6 months or in 1 or 7 years, who cares if the commanders leave the poor deck, if the faithful ones brought on the team remain on board.

Since 1947, when Ramadier, president of the socialist council, banished them from the government, the communists have been waiting--weapon ready, and always polished--to return. Oh, patience! When their adversaries remarked that it gave them the jitters, the answer rang out: "Didn't we have ministers during Liberation? Didn't they do their job?" Indeed they did. "After the war, when we had ministers among the members of government, we could prove that they did not act in a loyal manner. They did not behave like ministers taking part in a common task. They acted like 'Trojan horses' within the government, working exclusively for the Communist Party and not for the country." Who wrote that? M Mendes France (LE MONDE, 28 September 1954). And, further: "The working class knows perfectly well that the Communist Party is toying with it." Who said that? M Francois Mitterrand, senator of the UDSR [Union of the Socialist Republicans] (during a speech at the Mole-Tocqueville conference, 6 June 1958). If men have changed and if M Mitterrand has become, 23 years later, the president of the Republic, the PCF--the "Party!"--remains. Faithful to its history, its leaders, its tablets of the law, which have never been destroyed. Who say, "We are communists. We have to account to our party for the way we have performed the task entrusted to us by the working class. To what extent have you, communist (you, Fiterman; you, Jack Kalite; you, Anicet Le Pors; you, Marcel Rigout; all of you ministers...and I will close the parentheses), appointed through the trust of a mass organization, to what extent have you responded to this trust and fulfilled your tasks? The Party has the right to ask us to do this continuously," (Benoit-Frachon, then secretary general of the CGT, before the 13th Congress).

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In 1981, then, "they" are in the government. Honor to whom honor is due--that is, to the Party's No 2 man after Marchais, M Charles Fiterman, minister of state, minister of transportation who, in that capacity, is in charge of ports, airports, airlines, roads, the SNCF [French National Railroads], the RATP [Independent Parisian Transport System], supply routes and, in general, all of France's transportation, both in the civil sector as well as...national defense! Flanked by whom, M Fiterman? M Guy Braibant (charge for general policy, international and European affairs, administrative organs and management personnel), 54 years old, ENA [National School of Administration] graduate and coauthor (with Mme Questiaux, how about that!) of a book on "the control of administration and the protection of citizens." Alongside him we have M Denis Coton and M Perrod who, for 20 years, has been known by everyone in the bridges and highway department, where he is the only engineer who is a member of the PCF. When his predecessor was fired after several hours, M Perrod was named director of ground transportation, a huge section which the Party controls from now on, not only politically but operationally.

We also have M Jouary, former head of the intellectuals of the Seine-Maritime Federation (Roland Leroy's), and who was deserving of the name "prosecutor" for his zeal in carrying out the purges during the PCF's internal crisis in 1978. There is Porcu, communist deputy of Longwy, defeated in the legislative elections, who was reappointed as parliamentary attache; Amelie Dreyfus, secretary of the communist group at the European parliament, and former press attache at the Place du Colonel-Fabien; etc. For the moment, M Fiterman and the communist machinery surrounding him have been working systematically at consolidating his enormous ministry and assuring the CGT's superiority everywhere over the FO [Workers' Force] and the CFDT.

At Auteuil, there is even more vigorous control by the PCF, which is already in power there, over the SNCF's electronic management system (card catalogue on all personnel and salaries, files on tape, etc...). At the CGT level, all those officials with the card of the Socialist Party have been ushered out and replaced by carriers of another card. There is penetration of the CFDT, which is being pushed to extremes by CGT elements infiltrating it (there is a name for this: manipulation), so that it can launch strikes, take over local groups, stir up trouble here and there, actively interfere in the nomination of regional directors (recently, in Rouen and Lille); centering of the general management in the collimator to make it hang off balance, for the purpose of showing its incompetence and, once they have done that, replacing its members. As a grand finale, M Fiterman's loud cries accusing the CFDT--while he coolly manipulates it--of launching strikes, at first to discredit it, while observing out of the corner of his eye what these strikes are doing; and secondly, once the tests have been recorded, for launching a "general one" for which the CFDT would guarantee recurrences. A classic case. In fact, M Fiterman's primary objective is to use every means to "break" all unions other than the CGT. Among the railway workers, the FO is the privileged prey, the FO which, for example, is surprised at seeing Fiterman personally defend the ministry's point of view ("Never seen anything like it!" exclaims the secretary general of the FO Railway Workers' Federation) before the "joint statutory commission" which takes up regulatory problems every year, and to hear Fiterman state: "When it comes to unions' rights, we don't have to wait for the law." (sic!) Another example of "the minister's guided impartiality" is the Villeneuve-Saint-Georges conflict. We know that Fiterman spoke out vehemently against the strike, but do we know that there have been dozens of strikes since July, and that when Fiterman chose to condemn that one in particular, it was because the

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railway workers, none of whom is a CGT member, had decided on that strike? He had a good reason: the 10 CGT members had been thrown out by their central unit in January and had since rejoined the ranks of the FO.

On the Alert at the Work Sites

As for M Anicet Le Pors, minister of civil service (it is useless to x-ray his team which--from his director, Rene Bedouze, who heads the CGT workers' federation, to his cabinet head, Mme Uzan, an intense militant, not to mention M J-J Philippe, tenacious ENA alumnus of formidable ability--is no less replete with troublesome militants than Fiterman's), they don't sulk at the infiltration either, nor are they idle in the struggle between the FO and CFDT. It is an intense struggle because, traditionally, the people in management have never been enamored of the CGT. The workers are social democrats, belonging to the FO or the CFDT. This is where M Le Pors got the bright idea to allow politics free entry into the local organs of administration--in other words, to allow the CGT forcibly to penetrate the strongholds which up to now had been held by the other unions. Good idea, wasn't it?

But it is in the area of public health that the situation is perhaps the most interesting, if not the most disquieting. First of all, M Jack Ralite, who, in the communist group, was the man in charge of media and the intellectuals, is considered an "ace" at manipulating. Next, like his brothers in the party, he has solidly surrounded himself. His cabinet director is M Jacques Latrille, doctor of sciences and medicine, former professor at Bordeaux and for 15 years the official and voluntary technical advisor of the Communist Party office for problems of health. His cabinet head, George Merlhe, is a member of the PC with a permanent seat on the central committee. As for the assistant cabinet director, the strong man on the team, he is a former communist deputy of Gard, Gilbert Miltel, to whom the hierarchical structure has assigned "medical and paramedical affairs and training of the health professions." One of the most recent proofs of the clever work of penetration or infiltration was the accord reached at Elysee several days ago to nominate a new general director of Health and Hospitals. The former chief, M Choussat, finance inspector, hoped to be named budget director, and this was granted to him by M Fabius. This therefore cleared the way for the nomination of Professor Roux, a urology professor at Montpellier, but also a member of the Communist Party's Central Committee for about 10 years.

M Ralite stated that he was going to separate Health and Hospitals, which had up to then been under the same direction. But right this minute, we know that, for Hospitals, he has on his desk an order nominating a public aid worker who was active in the CGT study groups on hospital problems.

For the moment, the workers coming under M Ralite are arching their backs, but in 6 months the framework necessary for the Communist minister to exercise his authority unchallenged will be established. "Thus," an official of the ministry stated to us, "by Easter, no one will hesitate any more." At Place du Colonel-Fabien, the PCF headquarters, the man who supervises all placement of personnel around the Communist ministers is Philippe Herzog, a Polytechnical School graduate nicknamed Jojo's Attali. (Marchais is Jojo.) Herzog, whom they are talking about for a nationalized bank presidency, Suez or Paribas, is planning with Le Pors a bulldozer-style reform of the ENA and the Normale Sup. [translator's note: teachers' training college in Paris] to quash these citadels of "elitism" which, as one communist official said, produced the "brilliant guard dogs of the bourgeoisie."

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Does M Le Pors hope that, as a result of the reform, the new types of dogs coming out of the major schools will be trained to bite other passers-by? No doubt he does. Besides, in this regard, the battle in which the socialists and communists are so engaged in snapping at each other, becoming regular, fierce and sneaky OPA [Public Offer to Purchase], the nation's elite, does not lack coarseness. To us cry out the socialists, the CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], to us, the ENA, the PCF lashes back. To me, to you...and everyone draws back onto the cover, with their jaws shut.

Finally, M Rigout, minister of vocational training, is a happy man. "The bosses' money will let us conduct vocational training according to our principles!" he cries out rapturously. "According to our principles?" Yes, since the PCF was invited to send the training centers staunch militants to train--technically, of course, but also politically--young people seeking employment and a career. Thus, vocational training will become a type of clandestine school (aside from the official ones) for the future permanent cadres of the party.

Aside from the "covert" methodical and governmental activities of its ministers, the PCF is placing in businesses very special correspondents, thanks to its cells and also the diversified planting of a network of voluntary informants in all milieus, especially at the work sites. Recent circulars sent to the cells by Gaston Plissonnier, Central Committee secretary, are asking the militants to be in a constant state of alert at the work sites where they are evolving. Thus, every event capable of feeding the party's propaganda is immediately spotted and pointed out to officials of the local organizations, who transmit it to the Central Committee. Staunch and well-placed militants, chosen for 3 months by the local units, have thus become correspondents for the Central Committee, allowing the PCF to keep abreast of everything happening in businesses, but also in the administrations, and all the more rapidly since the party has set up a telex system connected to its Central Committee permitting rapid response to the questions and problems that come up

As for the media (radio, television, newspapers), M Juquin, member of the politburo, has been converted into a traveling salesman whom it is not good to contradict when he comes to present his men. There has been one flop, however. He recently turned up at an outlying station demanding that two journalists be placed there. The man in charge of the station, after listening to him present his merchandise, asked him softly, "Yes, Monsieur Juquin, yes, of course.... But what am I going to do with your two journalists if they are barred from the party someday? Are you going to ask me to lay them off?"

Thus, throughout the wheels of the state, we have communist ferrets, moles or buffalo. Already in control of whole segments of French society, the PCF has received a massive dose of anabolite from the ministers' entering the government, which has allowed it to strengthen inordinately its already formidable muscles. According to M Plissonnier, who controls the party's internal security and the outside activities of its agents, i.e., in the ministries or in businesses, the PCF's power should increase considerably by 1983, i.e., once the credibility of the sociocommunist power is consolidated and its willingness proven to stay in control of things in any events. Where there is resistance, they will proceed through acts of authority. They also rely on what a socialist official bitterly calls "dacha politics," used to corrupt a certain number of resisters and turn them into "fellow travelers." Dacha politics works well in the

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countries of the East. Why not France? Finally, there is opportunism, on the same level with alarm and caution. An example of this: 3 weeks ago, after Anicet Le Pors had authorized the workers to hold political meetings at the local administrative units, workers in the Ministry of Finance were surprised to find in their drawers or on their desks an invitation with a hammer and sickle stamped on the cover, which said: "French Communist Party--1st Arrondissement. Ministry Section of Economy and Finance. You are cordially invited to a fraternal meeting on Tuesday, 7 October at 6:15 pm in the Ministry Cafeteria (Block C), Rue Croix-des-Petits-Champs, in honor of the nomination of five of our old comrades to various offices within the new government." The meeting took place. Many workers were present. And not all of them were Communists.

It seems that when M Mitterrand decided to open the government's doors to the PCF, he considered that that would be the price he would have to pay for peace in society. "It is necessary to walk through the fire...." Several months later, not war, but bitter social guerrilla warfare broke out. As for the fire, as a pensive socialist deputy put it morosely, "perhaps we have gone through the fire, but the Communists are the ones carrying the torch."

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FRANCE

SECURITY MEASURES, HIRING OF GUARDS AT MATRA EXAMINED

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 2 Jan 82 p 28

[Article by Gilbert Maury]

[Text] Penetrating the civilian or military secrets at Matra is possible for anyone! That is what I discovered in the course of two singular nights in the so-called inaccessible domain of the company's establishment in Velizy. No need to paint one's face with burnt cork or dress up in dark clothes in order to cut the chain link fence surrounding the plant and break into the buildings like a thief. The commando tactic is out of style. As for getting one's hands on the key, it would not be very useful: At Matra, everything is open, except the front door, however, where one has to be careful.

In order to understand the whole story, let us begin at the beginning.

Looking for night work, at the beginning of November I contacted a security guard company which summoned me to its offices near the Gare de Lyon that very day. The interview was brief, so brief that I was astounded. Now I am less so. Since the wages are so low -- the hourly interoccupational minimum growth wage, even for night work -- those hired do not last long. Nevertheless, I was taken on as soon as I entered the office of the head of personnel. I filled out a form, my picture was taken, they gave me a suitable uniform: grey pants, blue coat with a shield, light blue shirt and a green parka, and I became a night watchman. They did not even ask for any identification. I was, or could have been, anybody.

The first two nights were spent in charge of the notebooks, keeping track of who ever came and went, vehicles and individuals. I made rounds outside, in a supermarket warehouse in the southern suburb.

The next two nights I was sent to the Matra plant in Velizy 2. There, in a room close to the entrance barrier outfitted with a coffee machine, refrigerator and a few armchairs, I met a nice crew of guards. Young and not-so-young, some belonged to a security guard company under Matra, while the others came from the one that hired me. One of them took me on my first round and, like a fascinating tourist guide, showed me all the buildings. It was 1900 hours and we were supposed to finish the first round at 2200 hours: three hours of walking through the corridors and from 300 to 400 doors to open and close.

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We began with the office of the chairman of the board, Jean-Luc Lagardere, on the eighth floor of Building A, an office paneled in teak, with a private bath and adjoining board room. Models of automobiles and missiles decorate the room, a privileged place where countless studies and projects know their fate. We went from one office to another, that of the board members, the secretaries of board members, the entire staff. But wait a minute! Drawers had been left open!

From the eighth floor to ground level, not one office was forgotten. While my guide checked the windows, I closed the closets that had been left open, along with some drawers stuffed with files.

Building B was just as rich in paneling and open drawers. I must admit that I scarcely paid any attention. My guide was there. Accounting, management, design, studies, projects, marketing: all big, long and laborious. But what do you know, a blueprint!

Informers

Two hours later, we reached Building C. The first rooms we visited were filled with electronic equipment. I went into the computer room and the photo lab. What a surprise! On one door there was a sign: "White Room - Do Not Enter," but it was open. My guide, aware of his duty, went in. He was constantly saying, "There's a lotta dough here, right?" One would in fact be tempted to touch things and even, absent-mindedly, try to operate them. Here a vacuum manipulator, there a blower, and a few offices further on, design plates -- with the blueprints in place, open -- then a room where we had to put on special shoes and where one cannot go in without a shirt (shoes and white shirts are hanging in the entryway; we did without them). Little pads were on the floor to absorb footsteps.

Another hallway, a huge door and then, incredibly, the ultimate: missile launchers, rocket nose cones, devices and gadgets that were enough to make the layman go pale and I did. Incredible but true, some might say, and yet, there was enough material there to make the day of any self-respecting informer. And there were plenty.

One watchman told a tale: "One day, we noticed, thanks to the equipment that records telephone calls, that a certain phone was often connected with a North African country. They went to see the individual who customarily occupied the office in question and he said he had never telephoned overseas. A discreet investigation was then made, watching everything that happened at night near the phone. They caught a North African guard calmly talking with his country, the plans and documents open before his very eyes. Since he was speaking in Arabic, no one ever knew exactly what he said." What a security system, you might say! And in fact, while the guard is responsible for keeping watch, no one keeps watch over the guard!

There were other incidents: the disappearance of an attache case that was found, after a laborious search, at the bottom of a garbage can; unauthorized telephone calls to Reunion, but this was not serious. It was only a cleaning woman.

In Building H, one cannot come and go at will. Some passageways are protected by an electronic system operated by a red light. When one walked in front of it, an automatic door like those in the Metro barred the way. Thanks to a blue and grey magnetic map they gave me, I could keep the door open for the three seconds

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I needed to get through. Armed with that little marvel, I could go everywhere. I visited the whole Building H, the "military security" building. Naturally, many doors were closed, but others were open and, since most offices communicated between one another by inside doors that were not closed, it was just as easy as in the previous buildings. But on the ground floor, a door to the outside was left open! "Oh, those are the data processing guys," my colleague and guide told me. "They don't like to fool around with the magnetic maps, so they always leave that door open."

That is why one has an "open-door policy" at night at Matra!

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

PSOE LEADERS SHOW CONCERN FOR FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

Gonzalez: Rightwing Civilians Responsible

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 21 Dec 81 p 19

[Text] The Spanish position was described as "paradoxically difficult" by Socialist leader Felipe Gonzalez when his 2-hour conference with King Juan Carlos ended. The crises in Poland and Nicaragua and the analysis of current Spanish politics were main topics in the meeting between the king and the opposition leader. According to Gonzalez, the only one of the Spanish party heads who wanted to comment publicly about the content of their conversations in Zarzuela Palace, the hazards for Spanish democracy are not in the malaise of some military personnel, but come from civilian sectors bent on "poisoning" a section of the armed forces. Felipe Gonzalez strongly emphasized that for the first time in the last 150 years in the history of Spain, 90 percent of Spaniards explicitly back a system of democratic liberties.

Political sources of various sorts have been positive in their evaluation of meetings between representatives of the press and the armed forces which took place throughout last week. In the course of a televised discussion, three military leaders brought forth the idea that the army deeply respects the Constitution. They indicated that coup-prone elements are a strict minority among members of the armed forces and they asked the press to try seriously to dispel all suspicion towards the military establishment on the part of public opinion. The controversy concerning press-armed forces relations began with the publication of the so-called "The 100 Manifesto," a document signed by 99 army leaders on the eve of the third anniversary of the Constitution in which they demanded in a positive way freedom of information on military subjects.

Guerra: UCD's Reaction Ineffective

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 21 Dec 81 pp 30-31

[Interview with Alfonso Guerra by Jose Manuel Arijia; date and place not specified]

[Text] He opens his eyes, made even larger behind the lens of his big spectacles, and he says: "With this dance routine Carlos Sotelo has put together with the ministers, what can be done?" Alfonso Guerra, number two in PSOE, believes little is being done and nothing can be done. Another opportunity is being lost--"perhaps the last," he adds--of leading the democratic system forcefully or firmly against the coupist sector, "against that civilian plot which never materializes."

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CAMBIO 16.--Why do you think the government isn't performing correctly?

Alfonso Guerra.--Because a government is needed which, in the first place, is capable of tuning in to the main concern of the nation at this time: to guarantee democratic stability. And that could come about if the prime minister of the government put in practice the same attitude the presiding officer of the Congress of Deputies, Landelino Lavilla, took in his speech. That is to say, as to that stand let forceful action be taken against that 2 percent of the population who want to end democracy.

Cl6.--Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo has also stated his decision to act decisively.

A.G.--Calvo Sotelo's tone is one of arrogance, of not looking out the window to see what goes on; because, how is he not going to be aware of what's happening in the barracks? And, this arrogance can sink us. But, actually, this is a kind of Venice where each day we are one centimeter deeper without realizing it.

Or, like the "Titanic" when the orchestra played Beethoven as the ship was sinking. And a man came up and said: "It's sinking," and nobody listened because they were listening to Beethoven. Well, a bit of that is what this fellow is bringing on us with that pianola he's playing on four keys as it sinks.

Cl6.--Well, what do you propose for getting out of this situation?

A.G.--We have to make the House sensitive to the fact that right now a government with a sizeable majority is needed. I mean either sitting down at the government's table or, by parliamentary agreement, insisting upon a parliamentary pact that inescapably would have as a fundamental objective, reinforcement of democracy and of not allowing an ultraright sector, because of its acts, to take over the nation.

But, the bad part is there is no sensitivity, because when we say these things there are people who respond: "These socialists are in a big hurry to govern. They want to be in power before their time." At day's end something happens like the manifesto by the 100 military leaders and they say, "Look, PSOE is right!" And the same ones who first said no then later say yes, and by week's end they cool off again and whatever warnings we might give about how bad the situation is, they again repeat: "Those who want to govern are now back again."

Cl6.--That is to say, in your opinion, the situation is serious and needed measures against coupists are not being taken.

A.G.--The fact that after the attempted coup d'etat on 22 November they were again allowed to go into the streets and thrash citizens is inconceivable for a government. In any other country, those who failed in a coup d'etat would probably have hidden under the debris so that no one would know who they were. But, not here. They come out in the open and say that I am the fascist. And 1,500 register, but they are not made public, so that in each city they would know who the fascists are who battered them. There is a kind of objective favoritism in this situation.

Cl6.--Will the socialists, after the latest occurrences, again espouse the need for a broader government or for a parliamentary agreement?

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A.G.--But, look, we did that on 24 February and got a no. The situation in which we find ourselves of absolute weakness, of internal UDC quarrels--because, on the contrary, Inigo Cavero stated his party's stand saying, "UDC is not a spare parts cooperative in power"--we again made the offer and Calvo Sotelo again said no.

But the situation still isn't resolved. For instance, they removed the defense of democracy law from the parliamentary left with a tooth extractor. I've yet to see them close EL ALCAZAR. So, why did they want the law? As a cover-up for specific persons who asked them for firmness? What must be done is to defend the democratic system and not to allow the attack on it that is always being made.

A parliamentary agreement with a strong government is a must which does not guarantee solution to the problems, but which permits thinking about what they can resolve.

Cl6.--If that parliamentary agreement is achieved to end coups, would you support this strong government?

A.G.--No, no. A government with competent people would have to be formed, which they probably could not do from the UCD. If it weren't a coalition government, they would have to find independent people, or whatever, but who had a guarantee and the support of parliamentary groups. Because with the dance routine Calvo Sotelo put together we aren't going anywhere.

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

PEREZ LLORCA COMMENTS ON DEEPER MEANING OF ENTRY IN NATO, EC

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 28 Dec 81 pp 31-32

[Interview with Jose Pedro Perez Llorca, minister of foreign affairs, by Antxon Sarasqueta of CAMBIO 16, in Madrid; date not given]

[Text] Jose Pedro Perez Llorca is a cautious cabinet minister. He weighs every word he says when answering a reporter's questions. He picks his way among problems concerning domestic policy and the party, as well as the foreign policy matters which he has been responsible for for 15 months as head of that ministry.

He almost never gesticulates. Seated in an armchair in the corner of his office in the Santa Cruz Palace, next to the popular Plaza Mayor of old Madrid, Perez Llorca has no objection to talking on any subject, but refuses to give specific dates, either for joining the Common Market or for opening the frontier barriers at Gibraltar.

In the background is the ministry desk, noticeably slanting because of the uneven and creaking wooden floor. Perez Llorca does not either smoke or drink. He concentrates on the questions and answers, and the reporter senses a "something" which might be remoteness, coolness, suspicion. It is part of the personality of a politician who does not appear to feel very comfortable with the press, but who takes his "medicine" because it is advisable for him to do so as a professional.

CAMBIO 16: One urgent and immediate problem, Mr Minister, is that risk of complications in our politics these days, which projects an image of instability to the outside world. Could this, or "a further step" paralyze the process of joining NATO and the Common Market?

Jose Pedro Perez Llorca: I don't believe that we have to go along with that hypothesis. All Spaniards want to preserve democracy. But it is clear that if those events should come about--and this should be explained to a very small sector of the country--all this process would be paralyzed and in ruins. But I have faith in a Spain which is secure, preserving democracy, working more with the West in every way, more consolidated.

CAMBIO 16: However, how could the repercussions abroad from the trials for the 23 February events affect Spanish foreign policy?

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Perez Llorca: I expect that justice will prevail; and furthermore, this is essential for Spanish democracy. In this context I also hope that it will contribute to casting some light on the scene before long.

CAMBIO 16: Couldn't this prejudice the negotiations on joining the EEC and the Atlantic Organization, for example?

Perez Llorca: We just received a clear vote of confidence (in Brussels, during the signing of the protocol on joining NATO). A meeting like the one that took place on that occasion, with that unanimous warmth and support, doesn't happen every day. I believe it must be emphasized that at this difficult time the Western governments are showing confidence in the democratic system. As for the Common Market, the difficulties or the slow pace of the negotiations to date are not in any way attributable to a lack of confidence. There is political confidence; and there are some problems, which can be overcome. Also, the democracies of the West support the Spanish democratic system.

CAMBIO 16: What tangible impact could joining NATO have on Spanish society and foreign policy?

Perez Llorca: Without giving up any possibility of action, without losing any independence or sovereignty, our country will carry more weight; it is going to be more respected and considered more effective by our friends and in the defense of our interests. Above and beyond this general result, joining means leaving behind a period which was characterized by isolation, and this is very important historically and politically.

CAMBIO 16: Can you be more specific?

Perez Llorca: Yes, it will be a step toward a policy of being present in a series of political forums in which we should participate if we want to discard the political burden which our relations with the United States have involved up until now. Up to now we have been in a unique position in Europe. We were the only country which had defense agreements with the United States outside the multilateral framework of the Atlantic Alliance. And this unique position--the product of a situation which is now happily behind us--is ending, leading to the normalization of our continent.

CAMBIO 16: There are those who think that it would be in Spain's interest to strengthen its relations with the United States, instead of expending so much effort in cooperating with a Europe which puts such great difficulties in its way.

Perez Llorca: That is not how I see it. I believe that it is much more in our interest to normalize, to move on to that ordinary kind of relations which the other countries of Western Europe have. The effort which Spain must make in its policies with the Western European cultures is necessary, because it is an effort to rise above a past. When Spain joins the EEC and NATO you will see that it simply has made an act of historical restitution, returning to the place where we should have been.

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CAMBIO 16: Couldn't this, for example, change our relations with the communist countries of the East?

Perez Llorca: The Eastern bloc maintains some privileged relations with the Atlantic Alliance. It is clear that there are European countries which have certain friendly relationships and policies with those countries (of the East), although within logical limitations; there are Federal Germany and France, to give some examples. Spain, during the time when it was outside the structure of NATO, was not one of these, because this would involve an especially intense and productive policy as regards the countries of the East. We are linked defensively in another unique way to the United States, and we are now changing this to a normal way of interacting with Eastern Europe, and this is putting an end to what we could call a propagandistic period on the part of one country of that bloc.

CAMBIO 16: To what degree could the crisis in Poland limit those relations with the communist bloc?

Perez Llorca: The government, the Congress of Deputies and the political parties, as well as the forces of labor have expressed their deep concern over the risk of foreign intervention in Poland. If this tragic eventuality should occur, it is obvious that it could not fail to affect Spain's relations with the countries of the East.

CAMBIO 16: Perhaps this type of crisis and conflict in certain areas of the world can explain the failure of the Conference on Security which has been going on in Madrid for more than a year?

Perez Llorca: Earlier, at the Helsinki Conference, there was a time which was preceded and followed by enormous difficulties, which in my opinion were due primarily to a greater inflexibility of domestic policy. The theme has continued in the Madrid Conference, where there has been great inflexibility, although the Western countries have made a tremendous effort to keep the conference going. It is a window open to a dialogue between the East and the West. A hope.

CAMBIO 16: Do you think that the negotiations on disarmament and limitation of nuclear weapons which are taking place in Geneva between the two great powers can reach a solution within a period of, let us say, 2 years at most?

Perez Llorca: There are realistic proposals on the table, which give signs of holding together. I view that process with optimism and hope.

CAMBIO 16: Returning to the subject of the Community, which is so important to our political and economic interests; why is the date for entry being put off?

Perez Llorca: The truth is that none of the parties have been talking about dates for quite some time. But the two news items that have come out this year have been about support for the EEC and the wish to resolve the real problems in the political negotiations.

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CAMBIO 16: France is one of the European countries which is putting the most obstacles in the way of the Spain-Community negotiating process. In our relations with our neighboring country, to what degree are the points of conflict concentrated in European matters; or are they broader, and do they affect other areas of the international scene such as Africa and Latin America?

Perez Llorca: I do not see that any basic relationship of conflict regarding foreign policy exists with France in other areas of the world. There is nothing in our position in North Africa, the Arab world and Latin America that could produce that conflict. There could be certain rivalries, but there is no confrontation which could give rise to difficulties in our relations. They basically arise from French domestic policies.

CAMBIO 16: In the case of our other neighbor on the continent, Portugal, it appears that problems could originate from Spain's joining NATO, and a certain competition between the commands, don't you think?

Perez Llorca: In our relations with Portugal we are giving that subject a real political dimension in the multilateral European context. I am enthusiastic about developing cultural ties with Portugal. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has had various contacts with our Portuguese friends, and this subject has never been a problem. The current position of Portugal, with a command which is not integrated into the continental European area, but rather into the Atlantic and North American area, makes for a situation where Portugal is the one who must decide if it is suitable. And it appears they have already done so. We do not make any pretension to command over Portuguese territory or its maritime area. It is not one of our objectives; on the contrary, we believe that Portugal should do it.

CAMBIO 16: Is it true that the dispute over Gibraltar will be favorably influenced by Spain's joining NATO, as Lord Carrington has stated, and that they even may open the gates very soon?

Perez Llorca: It is true that our joining NATO is introducing a new factor into Spanish-British relations and the problem of the Rock; a dynamic which is going to change things, and which is going to do it in our interest in the long run. But we must not expect that there will be a radical change here in the near future.

CAMBIO 16: Will Spanish policy regarding Guinea take a new direction?

Perez Llorca: The Spanish Government has a program for increasing our current cooperation with Guinea, to plan a new and more important phase of that cooperation and to try to put it on a course which would not only be educational, but would help the Guineans prosper and be able to lay the foundations of a law-abiding state.

CAMBIO 16: In recent months hasn't a greater Soviet and Cuban influence been detected in Guinea?

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Perez Llorca: No. Cooperation is an activity which requires patience, tenacity, knowing where we want to arrive at with our Guinean friends, and we are doing this. I have not detected any greater activity on the part of the Soviet and Cuban experts in Guinea.

CAMBIO 16: From the Spanish Government's point of view, what is the situation in northern Africa, and what is its role in the area?

Perez Llorca: Taking into consideration various principles, and friendship with all peoples, Spain also has to safeguard some interests. It is essential to work towards the stability and peace of the countries in the area. Spain views with concern what could be some talk of conflict (in the Sahara), and welcomes with support the steps taken by King Hassan in announcing the holding of a referendum in which the Saharans may express their wishes.

CAMBIO 16: The foreign policy of Spain appears to have undergone a shift--at least as far as economic interests are concerned--and it seems to lack aggressiveness. Is this going to change, and how?

Perez Llorca: It is only possible to speak of a shift in Latin America, and that stems from 1820-1830. After that, at this time, I do not see any shift, except that at times attention-getting gestures are made by one country or another, as France did a little while ago in Latin America (signing a joint document with Mexico), which evidently has aroused very little enthusiasm. I don't believe that we are lacking an aggressive policy in political matters, perhaps we are, yes, in commercial affairs. As regards the Arab world, our policy of presence is clearer now than ever in all fields. More than a showy policy of gestures, Spain needs a steady policy which constantly defends our interests.

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